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Service to Former Address Not Enough, Ohio Supreme Court Rules

September 18, 2025
NCAA

Summary

In Hunt v. Alderman, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that service of a complaint by certified mail to a defendant’s former address fails both the requirements of Ohio Civil Rule 4.1(A)(1)(a) and the due process requirement that service be “reasonably calculated” to notify the defendant. The Court’s decision emphasizes the burden of effecting proper service within statutory deadlines, regardless of whether actual notice is eventually achieved.

Factual Background

In 2012, Miguel Hunt and his wife filed suit against Summit County Deputy Sheriff Robert Alderman Jr., alleging Mr. Hunt sustained injuries during a law-enforcement training exercise. The lawsuit was pending for nearly seven years, before the Hunts voluntarily dismissed the matter, without prejudice, in 2018. The litigation was timely refiled in 2019.

For the refiled complaint, service was attempted by certified mail directed to Alderman’s former residence in Cuyahoga Falls. Alderman no longer lived there and had previously notified the Hunts’ counsel of his then-current address in Canal Fulton.

A tenant at the former address signed for the mail but did not realize it was addressed to Alderman. The document eventually made its way to Alderman via his father, after some delay.

Alderman filed an answer a few days after the deadline and then moved for summary judgment on the basis that the service was not perfected within one year as required by Ohio Civil Rule 3(A). The trial court granted summary judgment, and the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed.

Legal Issues

  1. Rule 4.1(A)(1)(a) vs. Due Process Requirement
    The question addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court was whether compliance with the technical requirements of Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a), i.e., using certified mail, suffices, or whether there is additionally a constitutional due process requirement that service be “reasonably calculated” to notify the defendant.
  2. Rule 3(A) – Timely Commencement of Action
    Whether the action was timely “commenced” under Civ.R. 3(A) depends on whether service was proper within the one-year period. If service is defective, the clock for commencement under Rule 3(A) does not begin.
  3. Burden on Plaintiff for Proper Service Regardless of Actual Notice
    The Court addressed whether plaintiffs can rely on actual notice (i.e., that the defendant eventually received the complaint) to cure defects in service, even when service was not reasonably calculated to provide notice.

Holding

The Supreme Court held that service to a former residential address was insufficient under due process because it was not reasonably calculated to reach Alderman. Even though certified mail was used (meeting the technical requirements of Rule 4.1(A)(1)(a)), service failed the “reasonably calculated” standard required by the Ohio Constitution.

The Court affirmed that Rule 3(A) requires service to be properly perfected within one year for an action to be considered timely commenced. Since service was defective, the action was not properly commenced under Rule 3(A).

The Court rejected the Hunts’ argument that actual notice (Alderman’s eventual receipt of the documents) could substitute for proper service under due process absent compliance with the “reasonably calculated” standard.

Legal Analysis

Service of Process Standards in Ohio

This case reinforces the dual requirement in Ohio for service of process: compliance with both the Rules of Civil Procedure and the constitutional due process guarantee. It is not enough to follow the technical steps of the rules (e.g., certified mail)—the method and address chosen must be reasonably calculated to notify the defendant.

Rule 3(A) – Commencement of Actions

The decision underscores that the one-year deadline under Civ.R. 3(A) to perfect service is strictly construed and strongly enforced. If service is defective under due process, Rule 3(A)’s time limit is not satisfied, and the action must be dismissed even if the defendant later obtains actual notice, and even after defendant files an Answer and actively engages in the litigation.

Burden on Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs carry the burden of ensuring proper service. Early knowledge of a correct address (or notice given to plaintiff) of the defendant’s whereabouts creates a heightened duty to use that address. Failing to do so, even inadvertently, can be fatal to claims.

Actual Notice Does Not Cure Defects

Even where the defendant receives actual notice before a deadline (or shortly after), the constitutional requirement of service being reasonably calculated to notify cannot be ignored. This limits arguments that “notice in fact” closes the door on service defects after the fact.

Practical Takeaways

For Plaintiffs/Counterclaimants and Their Counsel:

  • Verify Address Before Service: When selecting an address for service, ensure it is current, especially if the defendant has previously notified you of a different address.
  • Do Not Rely Solely on Past Addresses: Even if a service method (certified mail) is permitted, using a former residence can violate due process if the defendant no longer lives there and you were aware (or should have been aware) of a more accurate address.
  • Document All Notices: If the defendant notifies you of a change of address, document it and serve at the updated address. If you don’t receive such notice yourself, take steps to verify residency/address (e.g. records, public filings) if possible.
  • Timeliness is Key: Even after refiling, Rule 3(A) imposes a strict one-year deadline to perfect service. Delay or defective service can result in dismissal even if the merits are your claims are strong.
  • Don’t Assume Actual Receipt Saves You: Actual notice may not correct defective service under the Rules or the Constitution. Courts, as in Hunt, may dismiss actions even though the defendant eventually got the documents.

Implications & Broader Significance

This decision sharpens Ohio jurisprudence on service of process. It places greater emphasis on the constitutional due process overlay, not just the mechanics of service under the civil rules. It also signals that future litigants should be especially careful about address and notice issues, as courts may be less forgiving of procedural shortcuts or assumptions, even when litigants receive actual notice.

For jurisdictions with similar rules and due-process clauses, Hunt v. Alderman contributes to the body of case law emphasizing that sufficiency of service is a question not just of rule-following but of fairness and constitutionally protected rights.

Contact

For questions regarding the content of this article, contact KJK Litigation partner Dan Matusicky (DJM@kjk.com).