The 1st District Court of Appeals in the 2026 case entitled Chester v. Bridges recently upheld the well settled law in Ohio (and in most other jurisdictions) that pursuant to the “Statute of Frauds,” an oral promise to transfer real estate, without any signed written agreement or other signed writing will not be enforceable in courts of law.
What is the Statute of Frauds?
The “Statute of Frauds” is an ordinance in most establishing that certain contracts must be memorialized in a signed writing to be enforceable. Specifically, Ohio’s Statute of Frauds provides that “no action shall be brought upon a contract or sale of lands or interest in or concerning them, unless the agreement upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith.”
Similarly, ORC Sec. 1335.04 provides, “No lease, estate, or interest . . . in, or out of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall be assigned or granted except by deed, or note in writing, signed by the party assigning or granting it, or his agent thereunto lawfully authorized, by
writing, or by act and operation of law.”
Are There Any Exceptions?
As with most case law, there are exceptions to this “general rule” that courts have imposed to avoid unfair legal remedies. These types of exceptions are termed, “equitable exceptions.” The primary equitable exceptions to the Statute of Frauds are: “part performance” and “promissory estoppel.”
The doctrine of “part performance” basically dictates that a lease (or other contract) should not be rendered unenforceable due to technical failures or oral modifications when much of the contract has already been performed. The following factors are relevant when determining the applicability of the part-performance doctrine to an oral contract involving the transfer of real estate: (1) evidence of a change in possession; (2) payment of all or part of the consideration for the land; and (3) major improvements, alterations or repairs upon the land by the possessor.
The elements of a claim for promissory estoppel are: (1) a clear and unambiguous promise; (2) reasonable reliance on that promise; and (3) resulting injury from the reliance.
Facts of Chester v. Bridges
The Appellant, Tonkia Bridges had been a caretaker for Appellee Billy Chester’s cousin (Willa Goodwin) in Goodwin’s home in Cincinnati, Ohio. When Goodwin passed away, Chester not only inherited the home from Goodwin, but also “inherited” her caretaker. While a number of the facts are disputed between the parties to this case, both agree that Bridges provided Chester transportation, helped with cooking and cleaning, became involved with his finances, and had access to his bank account.
Chester, however, testified that Bridges was more a friend than a caretaker and while Bridges paid bills during that period, it was with Chester’s credit card. Chester further described the situation as more of a tenancy, where Bridges would not have to pay rent or household expenses, in exchange for helping Chester around the house and taking him to various appointments. Chester further testified that Bridges only took him to doctors’ appointments in hopes of having him found incompetent and thus being able to take control of Chester, his house and his bank accounts.
Bridges testified that Chester told Bridges in October 2021 that if anything happened to Chester, Bridges would receive the home. Bridges further testified that Chester promised he would leave the house to Bridges on more than one occasion, but Bridges acknowledged that she had no writing memorializing this statement and that it was never made in the presence of a third party. Bridges believed that Chester intended to give her the home to repay her for caring for him, and she testified that she would not have paid for any of the home expenses or quit her teaching job if she did not believe that she would be compensated.
Bridges and Chester even took out a joint loan to make repairs on the property, but Bridges acknowledged that she never personally made a payment on the loan.
After (according to Chester) Bridges took Chester to an attorney to try and “have her made his power of attorney “and “have herself placed in his will,” Chester told Bridges to leave his home, and when she refused, Chester filed an eviction complaint against Bridges.
Case History
The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas (the “trial court”) held that Bridges was occupying the premises without the consent of the owner, and it ordered her to vacate the premises. Underlying the trial court’s holding was its grant of Bridges’ motion for summary judgment, which called for the eviction as a matter of law since Bridges had no written contract to remain on the premises (and that any oral agreement for the conveyance of property would be an unenforceable violation of the Statute of Frauds). The trial court further held that a claim for promissory estoppel would fail because any reliance by Bridges on a promise from Chester to give her the house could not be reasonable if Bridges genuinely believed that Chester had diminished capacity and was unable to handle his own affairs.
The 1st District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling and concluded that an oral contract for the transfer of real estate was barred by the Statute of Frauds.
The 1st District Court of Appeals Reasoning/Opinion
In arriving at its decision, the court of appeals first analyzed whether the factors necessary to establish the exceptions to the Statute of Frauds rule of “no writing, no contract” were attained.
Based upon the facts of the case, the court first explained that none of the requisite factors to establish part performance were present. Bridges was only in possession of the house at the time of the litigation because Bridges refused to leave after Chester moved out (and demanded that Bridges leave the premises). Further, there was no rent or other payments made by Bridges to Chester, and finally, there was no evidence of any major repairs having been made by Bridges.
The court of appeals also held that the factors necessary to establish promissory estoppel were not proven. The court reasoned there was no clear promise made because the parties vehemently disagreed that any promise was made. Even if a promise had been established, the court reasoned that because the alleged oral promise in this case was akin to a promise to make a bequest in a will, and because that promise was legally unenforceable pursuant to the Statute of Frauds as well as ORC Sec. 2107.04 (establishing that no agreement to make a will or to make a devise or bequest can be enforceable unless it is in writing), any reliance by Bridges on that promise was unreasonable.
Key Takeaways
Any agreement to transfer an interest in real estate, including a sale, a gift, or a promise to leave property to someone, should be put in a signed writing as early as possible. Oral promises, however sincere, generally will not be enforced. The equitable exceptions are narrow and depend heavily on the facts.
The same principle applies well beyond inheritance disputes. Buyers, sellers, landlords, and investors should not rely on handshake deals, verbal options, or informal side agreements, and they should confirm that every material term, including any later change, is reflected in a signed document.
Even a signed writing does not guarantee enforceability. The parties must also have the legal capacity to enter into the agreement. When an owner’s capacity may be declining, as with dementia or another progressive illness, capacity becomes harder to establish as time passes. Property owners, and anyone expecting to receive property from them, should formalize these arrangements while the owner’s capacity is not in question.
To discuss further, contact KJK Real Estate attorneys Stephen Richman (SDR@kjk.com) or Matthew Viola (MTV@kjk.com).